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COMPETITION: THE WRONG GOAL
The Honorable Hullihen Williams Moore *
This program was described as one addressing certain pressing
issues relating to the organization, regulation, oversight, and
physical infrastructure of the electric industry in the context of
ongoing initiatives to restructure the industry. That is a tall or-
der. I want to focus on the context: "the ongoing initiatives to re-
structure the electric utility industry." Initiatives such as this re-
structuring should be founded on sound economics and -sound
public policy. Economics and economists are thus important.
Unfortunately, not everyone holds economics and economists in
high esteem. This may be understandable because often those in
government and industry use, or misuse, economics and econo-
mists to advance their own visions or ideas without performing,
or at least without revealing, the full analysis that a disciplined
economist would perform.
Wendell Berry is a Kentucky philosopher, writer, and advocate
for the farmer-not agribusiness, but the farmer--one who works
his own land. Mr. Berry has few good words for economics or
economists:
To those who still uphold the traditions of religious and political
thought that influenced the shaping of our society and the founding
of our government, it is astonishing, and of course discouraging, to
see economics now elevated to the position of ultimate justifier and
explainer of all the affairs of our daily life, and competition en-
shrined as the sovereign principle and ideal of economics.
As thousands of small farms and small local businesses of all kinds
falter and fail under the effects of adverse economic policies or live
under the threat of what we complacently call "scientific progress,"
the economist sits in the calm of professorial tenure and government
subsidy, commenting and explaining for the illumination of the press
• Commissioner, Virginia State Corporation Commission, 1992-2004. A.B., 1965, Wash-
ington & Lee University; LL.B., 1968, University of Virginia School of Law.
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and the general public. If those who fail happen to be fellow humans,
neighbors, children of God, and citizens of the republic, all that is
outside the purview of the economist.
1
Berry goes on to review how the displaced farmers have moved
to the cities as unemployed and, often, unemployable.2 He la-
ments the loss of top soil that he said is a result of competition.3
These, he says, are costs that are not accounted for.4 Wendell
Berry does not think that saying there will be some winners and
some losers is enough:
There is no limit to the damage and the suffering implicit in this
willingness that losers should exist as a normal economic cost.
The danger of the ideal of competition is that it neither proposes
nor implies any limits. It proposes simply to lower costs at any cost,
and to raise profits at any cost.
5
In his essays, Berry makes some important and valid points.
He highlights the downside of what we call progress: the loss of
topsoil, the displacement of families, the creation of unemploy-
ment, the destruction of communities, and the impact of the un-
employed on the cities, as well as many other issues.6 These is-
sues, however, are not, or rather should not be outside the
purview of the economist. The true economist would not agree
that "there is no limit to the damage and suffering.. . [that will
be acceptable] as a normal economic cost."
The issues Mr. Berry raises are costs, and they are considered
in a complete economic analysis. Some may be readily quantifi-
able. Others may be much more difficult to quantify and still oth-
ers, almost, or completely, impossible to value precisely. The true
economist, however, identifies these issues and costs and consid-
ers them in the analysis. In short, there is little that should be
"outside the purview of the economist" in forging public policy.
This symposium looks at aspects of a major policy initiative-
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's ("FERC") vision for
1. See WENDELL BERRY, Economy and Pleasure, in WHAT ARE PEOPLE FOR? 129, 129
(1990).
2. WENDELL BERRY, What Are People For?, in WHAT ARE PEOPLE FOR?, supra note 1,
at 123-25.
3. See id. at 124.
4. See id. at 123-24.
5. BERRY, supra note 1, at 131.
6. See BERRY, supra note 2.
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the electric utility industry. While the Standard Market Design
("SMD") and the White Paper' may never be adopted as such,
those documents are a fair statement of FERC's vision. I would
like to comment on FERC's vision. First, it must be recognized for
what it is: a public policy initiative that fundamentally re-orders
and restructures an industry that is the life blood of our economy.
Let me begin by backing up and stating some basics with
which I hope we can all agree. First, the overall objective of sound
public policy is to increase net social welfare-to make us collec-
tively better off. What does this mean in the electric industry?
Consider a basic premise with which, again, I hope we can all
agree. Electricity is necessary. We can argue about how much,
but however we define "necessary," electricity fits the definition.
I hope we can also agree on the goal of our society with respect
to the electric industry. Our goal should be an industry that pro-
vides reliable service at reasonable rates with the electricity pro-
duced and delivered in an environmentally responsible manner.
Once the goal is established, the goal becomes the polar star.
Each action we take, or fail to take, can, and should, be fairly
judged by whether it moves us toward, or away from, that goal.
This approach is critical to the current public policy debate in
the electric industry. Once the goal is established, our discussion
is then about the means to achieve the goal. The means do not
become the goal. Thus, competition cannot become the goal, but
rather the means to achieve our goal for the electric industry. In
like manner, regulation cannot become the goal.
As the idea of competition in wholesale and retail electricity
markets began to evolve some years ago, FERC began its move to
commoditize electricity. By "commodity competition," I mean a
market structure where the various components of electric power
service are separated, and where these components and their de-
rivative products are traded in a market that is characterized by
many buyers and many sellers. Corn is a good example.
7. Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service
and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452 (proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter SMD].
8. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, Docket No. RM01-12-000, WHITE PAPER:
WHOLESALE POWER MARKET PLATFORM, (2003) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/smd/white-paper.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2004).
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In the beginning, at FERC, the National Association of Regula-
tory Commissioners, and here in Virginia, we asked questions.
For example, how would prices be established? To the vast major-
ity of questions and issues raised, two answers were given. First,
"The market will take care of that," and whenever the follow-up
question, "How?," was asked, the second answer was given: "You
must have faith in the market."
My reaction and our advice at the state and federal levels have
been simple. First, perform a complete analysis considering all of
the costs, benefits, risks, and alternatives to attain the goal. Sec-
ond, do not make this leap of faith to competition thinking you
can make corrections on the way down without anyone getting
hurt.
FERC, of course, now acknowledges that the market does not
answer all of the questions everyone said it would.' This move to
competition at the state and federal levels has created many
problems. Often, proposed solutions raise more problems that
must be solved. At each stage, it appears that commodity compe-
tition is now the goal. FERC is adding level upon level of pro-
posed solutions in the form of regulations to try to make competi-
tion work.1° It is, I believe, appropriate to examine the costs and
the risks of these proposed solutions.
Let me just name a few of these solutions along with some
risks that FERC's endeavor may create. First, the price for elec-
tricity. As FERC has acknowledged, "[w]holesale electricity mar-
kets do not automatically structure themselves with fair behav-
ioral rules" as well as other elements necessary to check market
power and encourage entry."' FERC states this as though it has
made a great discovery.
California had its ideas as to how the market should be set up
and ruled, and few complained about them until they failed. Then
9. Id. at 1-3.
10. The SMD and related White Paper and its Appendix are prime examples. The
SMD rulemaking is over 600 pages in length, and the White Paper and Appendix outline
areas where yet more rules and regulations are needed. SMD, 67 Fed. Reg. at 55,452-54;
WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at app. A at 1-18. In response to these and other FERC ac-
tions, Regional Transmission Organizations ("RTOs"), such as PJM Interconnection, and
their members have dozens of filings pending. For a listing of all filings made by PJM In-
terconnection with FERC, see http://www.pjm.com/documents/ferc.html (last visited Nov.
9, 2004).
11. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 1.
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everyone, with the benefit of hindsight, "knew" they were going to
fail. They "knew" their failure was inevitable because California
did not do it right.12 Professor Frank Wolak of Stanford Univer-
sity is the current chairman of the Market Surveillance Commit-
tee of the California Independent System Operator ("ISO"). He
wrote a lengthy analysis of the California debacle. 3 He states
that the parties acted as expected.14 The fundamental failure was
that federal regulators failed to regulate.15 FERC failed to estab-
lish just and reasonable rates as it is required to do by the Fed-
eral Power Act. 6 Professor Wolak explains that there was no
"shortage of observers with radar guns" reporting the law break-
ers; instead, the problem was the failure of policemen to do their
jobs apprehending the speeders.'" He concludes that a fundamen-
tal lesson from the California crisis "is that FERC must regulate,
rather than simply monitor wholesale electricity markets.""
Professor Wolak ends his article stating that, in order to de-
termine whether the market is delivering economic benefits in
the form of lower prices to consumers than they would have re-
ceived in the "former vertically integrated utility regime," FERC
will need the information to determine what regulated prices
would have been in that regime. 9 This information would be, of
course, in addition to what is needed to not only monitor the
market but to regulate and correct abuses.
FERC now proposes Locational Marginal Pricing ("LMP") as a
solution.2" The LMP solution, in turn, creates problems of its own
12. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 107TH CONG., CAUSES AND LESSONS OF THE
CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS (2001), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/30xx/
doc3062/CaliforniaEnergy.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004); MANIFESTO ON THE CALIFORNIA
ELECTRICITY CRISIS (2001), available at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/news/California-
electricity-crisis.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
13. See Frank A. Wolak, Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis, available at
http://www.ef.org/documents/CA-crisisWolakvmd.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 1.
16. Id. at 4-9, 22-27, 32-37. The Federal Power Act may be found at 16 U.S.C. §§
791-828c (2000).
17. Id. at 43.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 44.
20. The concept of LMP is developed in paragraphs 203 through 253 in the SMD, un-
der the sub-heading "The New Congestion Management System." SMD, 67 Fed. Reg.
55,452, 55,479-48. FERC explains in paragraph 205:
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that must be solved. First is the problem of market power. Ac-
cording to FERC, that must be monitored and mitigated to avoid
market abuses.2'
This monitoring and mitigating leads to other questions that
require answers. First, can all aspects of the energy market be
monitored in a timely and effective manner? This question is not
easy to answer and has not been answered.
Market monitoring across this nation is a daunting task. The
transactions are so numerous, varied, and complex as to render
timely monitoring almost impossible. FERC has created an Office
of Market Oversight and Investigation to address nationwide
market monitoring.22
If the market can be monitored, then how to mitigate becomes
the issue. Using the cost of a unit as a limit, for example, creates
other issues to address.2" Who monitors the cost? Almost every
LMP is a market-based method for congestion management. Congestion is
managed through energy prices and transmission usage charges (congestion
and loss charges) determined in a bid-based market. When there is no con-
gestion anywhere on the system (when there is enough transmission capacity
to get power from the cheapest available generators to all potential buyers)
there will be only one energy price in the transmission system, the price bid
by the last, or marginal, generator that provides energy or load that offers to
reduce its demand. When there is congestion, the cheapest generators may be
unable to reach all their potential buyers. Consequently, when there is con-
gestion there may be many different energy prices across the transmission
system. Under LMP, the Independent Transmission Provider will establish
separate energy prices at each node on the transmission grid and separate
prices to transmit energy between any two nodes (receipt and delivery points)
on the grid. These prices reflect the cost of congestion. LMP relies on eco-
nomic redispatch in managing congestion. Redispatching means decreasing
the energy the Independent Transmission Provider obtains in front of the
constraint (where the power is flowing from) and increasing the energy the
Independent Transmission Provider obtains behind the constraint (where the
power is flowing to). The cost of redispatch is the basis for the congestion
charges under LMP. If a customer is willing to pay the marginal cost of re-
dispatch, which it signals through its bids, the Independent Transmission
Provider will schedule the transmission service.
Id. at 55,480.
21. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 1, 8-9, app. A at 11-12.
22. The White Paper states in broad generalities what should be accomplished. For
example: "The market power mitigation measures must protect against the exercise of
market power without suppressing prices below the level necessary to attract needed in-
vestment in new infrastructure in the region." WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 8. The three
short paragraphs on Market Monitoring and Market Power Mitigation do not suggest how
this may be accomplished. See id. at 8-9.
23. Under LMP in FERC's SMD, bid caps are envisioned as necessary mitigation for
market power. These caps may be based on cost. SMD, 67 Fed. Reg. at 55,506.
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generator could be the price setter at some node at some time or
another. How will that be monitored in a timely manner? Correc-
tions made two years, or even two weeks later, could be too late.
FERC is also concerned not only that prices will be too high,
but also that the price under its regime may be too low to attract
adequate generator growth at the right place at the right time.24
This, of course, leads to another regulation dealing with resource
adequacy. This notion has not been fully developed, but rather
has been deferred.25
Transmission also creates issues. Will there be adequate
transmission not only for reliable electric service, but additional
transmission to allow competition to work effectively? Here,
FERC is sending new signals for incentives that are add-on bo-
nuses to otherwise just and reasonable rates.2 6 These are incen-
tives, thought necessary by FERC, to get the utility to perform its
public service regulated duty-transmission service.
The move to competition has also created credit problems for
several regulated firms and many independent power produc-
ers.
27
My list is not exhaustive, but rather illustrative. It is fair to
say that none of the "solutions" I have just discussed are neces-
sary under traditional cost of service regulation, because cost of
service does not create the problems that the regulations that try
to make competition work do. I am not saying that cost of service
has no problems, but certainly not all of these.
My great concern is that FERC has not done an economic pol-
icy analysis. It has not done its homework. For example, FERC
24. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 8.
25. The issue of resource adequacy is basically deferred and shifted to the states to
address. Little or no guidance is given as to where or how resource adequacy will be en-
sured. See id. at 11, app. A at 17.
26. See, e.g., Order Accepting and Suspending Proposed Tariff Sheets, Instituting Sec-
tion 206 Investigation, Consolidating Proceedings, and Establishing Hearing Procedures,
[Jan. 2004-Mar. 2004 Transfer Binder], 106 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,005 (Jan. 2, 2004); Proposed Pricing Policy for Efficient Operation and Expansion of
Transmission Grid, 68 Fed. Reg. 3842 (proposed Jan. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
pt. 35).
27. For a discussion of credit problems, see VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, STATUS REPORT:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPETITIVE RETAIL MARKET FOR ELECTRIC GENERATION WITHIN
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA PART 1, at 1-4 to 1-6 (2004), available at http://www.
state.va.us/scc/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
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has not factored in the risks of their proposal compared to tradi-
tional regulation. These risks are numerous and great.
The first risk is the move to commodity competition itself. This
includes, for example, how market monitoring and mitigation will
work. The risk of failure for a new system can be great. California
taught us that.2" There is risk of significant price increase and
price volatility. There is an increased risk of generation inade-
quacy that FERC now acknowledges.29 There is a risk of inade-
quate fuel diversity.
There is reliability risk associated with coordination among
generators and transmission operators. Will FERC's Regional
Transmission Organizations ("RTOs") be able to prevent and con-
tain outages as well as under the old system? Will old neighbors
who are now competitors act as they used to? Will new generators
act as generators did when they were part of an integrated
whole? August 14, 2003, is certainly not a confidence builder in
this area. The outage began in a FERC-approved RTO.3 ° And, all
must agree, it was not contained." Another box and another
string in an RTO structure, or another department at FERC, may
not be the answer to August 14th. This risk must be analyzed
and evaluated. We must not only speak of patches and fixes: we
must look at the underlying model and problem.
There is a risk that there will be inadequate infrastructure to
support competition. This risk means that we may continue with
the mitigation limits such as LMP. These limits, and LMP itself,
are, in fact, different kinds of price regulations.12 It is not a free
market-it is a type of price regulation, and it may be driving
28. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
29. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 3, 8.
30. For an explanation of the causes and response to the August 14, 2003 blackout,
see U.S.-CANADA POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14,
2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2004), available at https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-web.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2004).
31. See NATURAL RESOURCES CANADA & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE AUGUST 14, 2003
BLACKOUT ONE YEAR LATER: ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA TO
REDUCE BLACKOUT RISK 1 (2004) (reporting that eight states and fifty million people were
without power), available at http://www.doe.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/137200412176-
Blackout-OneYearLater.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
32. See SMD, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,479-87 (proposed Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing LMP and market power migration).
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prices higher than traditional regulation with no offsetting bene-
fit.
We also do not know the real cost of implementing FERC's
competition vision. The cost to form and administer the RTOs has
amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars. The incremental cost
of implementing FERC's SMD is estimated to be about $760 mil-
lion per year nationally according to the United States Depart-
ment of Energy ("DOE").3 While these costs are and will be sig-
nificant, they are not all of the costs. What will the cost of
monitoring and mitigating market power be? We do not know be-
cause we do not know how it will be done. We do know the effort
must be massive.
We also do not know the cost of generating units and transmis-
sion lines that are needed to support competition but are not
needed for reliability. The total cost of these additions must be
recovered in savings compared to the old regulated regime.
Will the SMD create winners and losers? Will there be an over-
all net benefit and, if so, is there a way, at least, to hold everyone
harmless? Or, is this really a transfer of benefits so that rates
may rise, drop, or stay the same overall, but with the low rate
customers paying more and the higher rate areas getting lower
rates?
Last year the DOE issued a cost/benefit analysis of FERC's vi-
sion as stated in the SMD.34 It answers some of these questions,
but it does not make a compelling case for going forward. Indeed,
based on this study, FERC should abandon its vision.
Time does not permit a detailed discussion of the DOE report,
but let me outline the major assumptions and highlight several
points. The study assumes no costs for the added infrastructure,
wires, and plants needed for competition that are not needed for
reliability." Also, the study does not factor in any of the risks I
have mentioned earlier.
The study does assume a two percent increase in efficiency for
coal units as a result of the SMD and a four percent increase in
33. Id. at 17-19 (showing the median annual revenue requirement for operating vari-
ous RTOs in tab. 3.2).
34. See id. at vii-ix.
35. Instead it assumes additional generation will be constructed "as economically jus-
tified." Id. at 16.
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efficiency for gas units because of the SMD. 36 The report does not,
however, explain how these efficiencies may be achieved, but just
assumes they will occur.37 These figures may sound insignificant,
but in a generation market worth hundreds of billions of dollars,
two to four percent adds up to some real money.
The study also assumes transmission capability will increase
five or ten percent as a result of dispatch over larger areas.3" And,
of course, it assumes perfect competition without any market
manipulation. 9
Now, with these positive assumptions, we should have positive
results, depending on the cost to implement, which the DOE es-
timated to be about $760 million per year. Two points are clear
from the study. First, the net benefits of FERC's vision will be
small, if anything. In the short term, depending on the assump-
tions, net benefits range from $700 million to $1.1 billion per
year.40 Long term net benefits are projected to range from $200
million to $700 million per year.41 These numbers are country-
wide. While those are large numbers, they are nothing compared
to the overall cost of electricity in the United States which the
Energy Information Administration reported to be $250 billion in
2002.42
This is particularly true when we realize that none of the risks
I have mentioned have been factored in, and none of the costs for
the extra power plants and wires needed to make competition
work have been included.
The second point that is clear is that there are areas of the
country that are winners and other areas that are losers. Looking
36. Id. at 11.
37. See id. The assumption is based on "empirical evidence of generator efficiency im-
provements in the past few years for plants in the Northeast ISOs relative to the rest of
the Eastern Interconnection." Id. The rationale for the increase in efficiency is based on
price signals without any cited study or analysis. See id. We do not know whether the rela-
tive amount of new equipment was the same in each area, and if it was not the same, why.
There is no discussion or analysis of why the competition among vendors of new equip-
ment would not increase efficiency everywhere.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 2. Under the SMD case, pricing is based on marginal costs. Id.
40. Id. at 27.
41. Id.
42. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2002, 6-7
tbl. ES (2002), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epates.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2004).
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at the retail rates and the long term analysis, of the sixteen
North American Electric Reliability Council ("NERC") sub-
regions in the study, six are projected to have rate decreases,43
five are projected to have rate increases," and five break even.45
For this we are going to restructure an entire industry?
As FERC and others have moved forward with competition,
they have lost sight of the goal. Instead of reliable service at rea-
sonable rates and environmental responsibility, FERC has made
competition its goal.
43. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: IMPACTS OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR STANDARD MARKET DESIGN 30, 31, 34, 38, 39,
43, available at http://www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/96200314265_DOE501385
MDfinal.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).Consumers in six areas are projected to have de-
creases in the long term in generation and transmission costs as a result of the SMD. Dis-
tribution costs, which generally amount to approximately twenty-five to fifty percent of a
customer's bill, were not included in the analysis, and it is unlikely that such costs would
be impacted by SMD. Of the six areas, four are projected to have generation and transmis-
sion costs decrease by one percent; one area is expected to have such costs decrease by two
percent; and one area is expected to have such costs decrease by four percent. The six ar-
eas and the percentage decrease are as follows: MAAC Region (most of Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, most of Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia): negative four percent;
VACAR Region (eastern Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina): negative one per-
cent; ECAR Region (lower Michigan, western Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana,
and Kentucky): negative two percent; MAPP Region (North Dakota, most of Minnesota,
most of South Dakota, western Iowa, Nebraska, and eastern Montana): negative one per-
cent; SPP Region (Kansas, Oklahoma, western Arkansas, northwestern and central Lou-
isiana, northwestern Texas, and eastern New Mexico): negative one percent; and CA (most
of California): negative one percent. Id.
44. Id. at 32, 33, 36, 40, 42. Consumers in five areas are projected to have increases in
the long term in generation and transmission costs as a result of the SMD. Again, distri-
bution costs, which generally amount to twenty-five to fifty percent of a customer's bill,
were not included in the analysis, and it is unlikely that such costs would be impacted by
the SMD. Of the five areas, two are projected to have generation and transmission costs
increase by three percent, and three are expected to have such costs increase by one per-
cent. The five areas and the percentage increases are as follows: Southern Region (Geor-
gia, most of Alabama, and parts of Florida and Mississippi): one percent; FRCC Region
(most of Florida): one percent; MAIN Region (Illinois, eastern Wisconsin, northern Michi-
gan, southeastern Minnesota, eastern Iowa, and eastern Missouri): three percent; N'WPP
Region (Washington, Oregon, Idaho, most of Montana, western South Dakota, Wyoming,
Utah, most of Nevada, and part of northern California): one percent; and AZN Region
(southern Nevada, Arizona, most of New Mexico, and a small area of western Texas):
three percent. Id.
45. Id. at 28, 29, 35, 37, 41. Consumers in five areas are projected to have generation
and transmission costs remain unchanged as a result of SMD. The five where such costs
are projected to remain unchanged are: New England Region; New York Region; TVA Re-
gion (Tennessee, western Virginia, northeastern Georgia, northern Alabama, and north-
ern Mississippi); Entergy Region (western Missouri, eastern Arkansas, and northeastern
Louisiana); and RMPA Region (Colorado). Id.
2005]
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By making competition the goal, FERC has thus made a seri-
ous mistake. That mistake results in FERC not considering all of
the alternatives to achieve the real goal and not considering all of
the risks. If the DOE study is valid, it shows that FERC's SMD
does not appear to be a good vehicle to attain the real goal.
Given the DOE report and the slight overall savings, the unac-
counted-for costs and risks, as well as the rate increases for a
number of areas of the country, it would be unconscionable for
FERC to force anyone to submit to its vision.
FERC as well as other interested persons, must determine
whether this is sound public policy. Instead, FERC and others as-
sume that competition must be the model. This symposium as-
sumes that competition must be the model. With blinders on,
patch on patch has been made. Let's try "this" to solve this prob-
lem. If it doesn't work, let's try "that." The SMD and its White
Paper are examples of this approach.46 At some point, it's time to
back up and see if the overall vision is worth it.
Professor Wolak argues that we must have the data to see if
competition is better than regulation in order to continue.4" I be-
lieve that we must study first and conclude, based on such a
study-not hope, not faith, not theory alone, but on facts-that
we will be better off. That, however, has not happened.
It has been years since this experiment began. Utilities have
gone bankrupt and others have been brought to their knees. Hun-
dreds of small businesses closed because of FERC's vision. The
DOE report is all we have. Its assumptions favor competition.
Yet, there is essentially no net benefit for the nation as a whole.
The time is now to examine and reflect, not just to go forward
blindly hoping something will make this pig fly.
The time for blind faith and hope alone is over. As Robert Frost
said, "[tiruth broke in [w]ith all of her matter-of-fact."4" That
truth and matter of fact here are not ice storms as they were for
Frost. California, the Midwest, August 14, 2003, and the patches
that are not working, those make up the truth that has broken in,
the truth that cannot be ignored.
46. See supra notes 7-8.
47. Wolak, supra note 13, at 44.
48. ROBERT FROST, Birches, in COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 152 (1949).
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COMPETITION: THE WRONG GOAL
To those who say it is too late to turn back, I say it is never too
late to do it right. Right might be traditional regulation rather
than this new layer upon layer of untried regulation with greater
risk to both price and reliability.
I ask Congress, FERC, and you to remember where we started:
" The objective of sound public policy is to increase net social
welfare-to make us collectively better off.
" Electricity is different. Electricity is necessary.
" Our goal for the electric industry is to provide reliable ser-
vice at reasonable rates with the electricity produced and
delivered in an environmentally responsible manner.
We must study all the costs, all the risks, all the benefits, and all
the alternatives-not just the part FERC wants to study.
Finally, I ask that Congress, FERC, and you remember
Wendell Berry. Remember that saying "there will be winners and
losers" is not enough. You must look out not just for corporate
America, not just for the ISOs, RTOs, and utilities, but for the
people as well.
Remember those Wendell Berry spoke of. Remember our "fel-
low humans, neighbors, children of God, and citizens of the re-
public." They should be the beneficiaries of our actions, not the
victims.
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